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Abstract
A publish-subscribe system is an information dissemination infrastructure that sup-
ports many-to-many communications among publishers and subscribers. In many
publish-subscribe systems, in-network aggregation of input data is considered to be
an important service that reduces the bandwidth requirements of the system signifi-
cantly. In this paper, we present a scheme for securing the aggregation of inputs to
such a publish-subscribe system. Our scheme—which focuses on the additive aggre-
gate function sum—preserves the confidentiality and integrity of aggregated data in the
presence of untrusted routing nodes. Our scheme allows a group of publishers to pub-
lish aggregate data to authorized subscribers without revealing their individual private
inputs to either the routing nodes or the subscribers. In addition, our scheme allows
subscribers to verify that routing nodes perform the aggregation operation correctly.
We use a message authentication code (MAC) scheme based on the discrete logarithm
property to allow subscribers to verify the correctness of aggregated data without re-
ceiving the digitally-signed raw data used as input to the aggregation. In addition to
describing our secure aggregation scheme, we provide formal proofs of its soundness
and safety.
1 Introduction
A publish-subscribe (pub-sub) system [2, 3, 18, 21, 17] is an information dissemination
infrastructure that supports many-to-many communications between entities in a wide-area
network. In a pub-sub system, publishers submit information to the system, while sub-
scribers can register to receive publications of interest. Data is routed through a network of
routing nodes that form an overlay network in the system. Pub-sub systems scale to handle
large volumes of data from many applications by establishing routing paths that efficiently
deliver messages to subscribers while eliminating duplicate messages along those paths.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in pub-sub systems that support in-network
aggregation, in which routing nodes perform hierarchical aggregation on data that is pub-
lished to the system. In-network aggregation is useful for applications that monitor the state
of wide-area control systems—such as the electric power grid [22] and building manage-
ment systems (BMSs) [10]—by collecting individual readings from an array of sensors and
other devices. The sensors and other devices monitoring the control system act as pub-
lishers that push measurements to the pub-sub system, while monitoring applications act
as subscribers that later receive those events from the system. In some cases, sensors de-
ployed over a wide physical area can generate data at very high rates. For example, phasor
measurement units [19] used in the electric power grid generate data many times per sec-
ond. Since most monitoring applications make control decisions based on aggregated data
computed from raw sensor data, the demanding bandwidth and latency requirements of the
pub-sub system can be reduced through the use of hierarchical in-network aggregation.
Safely supporting hierarchical in-network aggregation in a pub-sub system requires that
we address two important security issues. First, publishers should be able to protect their
individual inputs from potentially untrusted routers and subscribers. For example, in the
power grid, utilities must hide their market sensitive input data from their competitors.
Similarly, in BMS systems, the occupancy of a certain room in a building could reveal the
occupants’ private activities, while aggregate occupancy information for sections of the of
the building is likely to be safe to disclose. Since routing nodes in a wide-area pub-sub sys-
tem are typically managed by entities in different administrative domains, we must assume
that publishers do not trust routing nodes in other domains in terms of the confidentiality
of their published data. Therefore, our secure aggregation protocol should allow untrusted
routing nodes to perform aggregation of raw data without learning the private input values.
Second, subscribers should have some assurance regarding the authenticity and integrity
(correctness) of the aggregate data that they receive. Data integrity is critical for monitoring
applications used in control systems, as these systems make control decisions based upon
aggregated data received from the pub-sub system. Without this property, malicious routers
could modify the data aggregated by the system, thereby tricking monitoring applications
into making unsafe control decisions. Ensuring this integrity property on aggregated data is
challenging because subscribers may not completely trust the routing infrastructure used by
system. Furthermore, since thousands of publishers might contribute to a single aggregate
data item, subscribers require a means of verifying the correctness of aggregate data without
checking signed raw data, as this defeats the purpose of in-network aggregation.
In this paper, we present a secure aggregation protocol for the additive aggregate func-
tion sum. We believe that this is a reasonable first step towards the general secure aggrega-
tion problem for publish-subscribe systems because we can reduce other useful aggregation
functions—such as average, count, variance, and standard deviation—from the sum func-
tion. Our protocol allows a collection of publishers to publish an aggregate result derived
from their individual private inputs that is released only to authorized subscribers. Thus,
such a publish-subscribe system enables users in the system to share useful statistical in-
formation without compromising the confidentiality of individual raw data. In addition,
we apply a message authentication code (MAC) scheme based on the discrete logarithm
property to allow subscribers to verify the correctness of aggregated results. Our scheme
eliminates the necessity of providing a subscriber with the signed raw data used as input
to the aggregation, and enables each subscriber to verify the correctness of aggregated data
using an aggregated MAC of a constant size. We prove that our protocol satisfies the sound-
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ness and safety requirements of both publishers and subscribers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our system and attack models
for pub-sub systems in Section 2. We then present our aggregation protocol and proofs of
its safety and security properties in Section 3. We discuss a possible way of extending our
protocol to reduce our trust assumptions in Section 4. We cover related work in Section 5
and present our conclusions and directions for future work in Section 6.
2 System model
2.1 System overview
We assume that a publish-subscribe system consists of a set of routing nodes as well as a
trusted security manager node, while publishers and subscribers exist as applications out-
side of the pub-sub system. We assume that every publisher, subscriber, and routing node is
managed by some principal in the set P of all principals. The security manager is a central
authority that is trusted by publishers and subscribers to coordinate the system. Each prin-
cipal pi ∈ P maintains a public key pair (Ki,K−1i ), and can obtain the public keys of other
principals using a PKI or some other key distribution service. We assume that publishers
publish data items from some value set V .
Figure 1 describes the interactions between publishers, subscribers, and the components
of the publish-subscribe system. First, each publisher notifies the security manager of the
confidentiality policies protecting the aggregation of its data values. As a result, the se-
curity manager has a complete view of all data confidentiality policies. When a principal
wishes to begin a subscription, he issues a subscription request to the security manager. A
subscription request is a set of (principal, variable) pairs in P × V that represents the sum
of variables that is to be computed. For example, a subscription request for the sum of pub-
lisher principal p0’s variable v0 and p1’s variable v1 is represented as {(p0, v0), (p1, v1)}.
After a subscription request is issued, the security manager checks whether the sub-
scription request satisfies the confidentiality policies of the publishers owning the variables
comprising the subscription request. If the appropriate confidentiality policies are satis-
fied, the security manager computes a hierarchical routing and aggregation path from the
publishers to the subscriber, which is then sent to the appropriate routers. Exactly how the
security manager should compute this routing path is out of the scope of this paper—our
secure aggregation protocol is independent of the routing path computation algorithm. At
this point, the publishers can send their data to routing nodes, which forward the data while
performing in-network aggregation. Finally, each subscriber receives the final aggregated
data from the root routing node of the routing path.
Each publisher pi publishes a variable vi repeatedly, and we denote variable vi at time t
by vi(t). When a pub-sub system aggregates multiple variables, it only aggregate variables
with the same timestamp. Therefore, if each publisher pi for i = 1 to n publishes a variable
vi, a subscriber who subscribes to the sum of those variables will receive
∑n
i=1 vi(t) at each
time step t.
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Figure 1: System model. Each arrow is labeled with data transferred between two compo-
nents.
2.2 Confidentiality policies
Each publisher pi can define confidentiality policies to limit access to the variables that it
maintains. Specifically, a publisher pi can define an access-control list acl i(vi) to limit
access to variable vi. If acl i(vi) = {pj}, only subscriber pj can receive pi’s variable vi.
If any other subscriber pk issues a subscription request for the variable vi, the security
manager maintaining pi’s confidentiality policies rejects pk’s request.
Each publisher can also define an access-control list that protects the sum of multiple
variables, some of which are maintained by other publishers. For example, pi can define
policy acl i((pi, vi), (pj , vj)) to protect the sum of pi’s vi and pj’s vj . When a subscriber
pk issues a subscription request {(pi, vi), (pj , vj)} for the sum of the two values, pk must
satisfy both pi and pj’s confidentiality policies on the sum of those two variables; that is,
pk ∈ acl i((pi, vi), (pj , vj)) and pk ∈ acl j((pi, vi), (pj , vj)) must hold.
2.3 Attack models
We now consider attacks on the system from the viewpoints of both publishers and sub-
scribers. From the viewpoint of publishers, there are two kinds of adversaries. One is an
adversary of colluding routing nodes that attempts to learn an aggregated sum in an unau-
thorized way. The other is an adversary who tries to learn some publisher’s individual data
value in an unauthorized way. The second type of adversary could include unauthorized
subscribers as well as untrusted routing nodes. Such colluding parties can freely share
messages that they obtain through the process of in-network aggregation. They can also
intercept all the messages among all the parties who participate in the aggregation pro-
cess. In this paper, when we consider an adversary who tries to learn individual data in
an unauthorized way, we assume that the adversary consists of up to m routing nodes and
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subscribers.
In this paper, we do not address inference attacks carried out by subscribers with mul-
tiple subscriptions. We assume that each publisher trusts the security manager to make the
proper authorization decisions such that subscribers cannot infer unauthorized data from
multiple subscriptions.
From the viewpoint of subscribers, attackers are untrusted routing nodes that incorrectly
aggregate data values. Such an adversary can be comprised of any number of colluding rout-
ing nodes. On the other hand, we assume that publishers are not part of an adversary against
subscribers because publishers can always modify the aggregated data by providing mali-
cious input data while otherwise following the aggregation protocol properly. Therefore, if
a subscriber psub subscribes to an aggregated result that includes some publisher pi’s data,
psub implicitly trusts pi to provide correct input data. We note that each subscriber must
trust other subscribers who subscribe to the same subscription not to construct a bogus re-
sult by colluding with some routing nodes. We will describe an extension of our protocol
that removes this trust assumption in Section 4.
3 Secure aggregation in a pub-sub system
In this section, we describe our protocol incrementally. In Section 3.1, we first present a
protocol that preserves publishers’ confidentiality while aggregating data. We then present
a protocol that ensures the integrity of aggregated data in Section 3.2. Finally, we present
an integrated protocol that ensures both the confidentiality and integrity requirements of
publishers and subscribers in Section 3.3.
3.1 Confidentiality-preserving aggregation
We now describe an aggregation protocol that preserves the confidentiality of each pub-
lisher’s private input. Consider the case in which there are n publishers, p1, . . . , pn, and
a single subscriber psub involved in the aggregation protocol. Each publisher pi maintains
a private variable vi and an associated confidentiality policy acl i(vi) = ∅. That is, pi
is not willing to disclose vi to any other principal. However, every pi is willing to dis-
close the sum
∑n
i=1 vi to the subscriber psub and thus defines the confidentiality policy
acl i((p1, v1), . . . , (pn, vn)) = {psub}. The n publishers will use the pub-sub system to dis-
seminate the sum of their private variables to the subscriber psub. Recall from Section 2.3
that we must consider attacks launched by coalitions of up tom colluding nodes, including
router nodes and the subscriber psub.
Our protocol protects each principal pi’s private data vi from unauthorized routing
nodes and subscriber psub by requiring that each pi splits their value vi into m shares,
which are then sent tom different routing nodes. However, this scheme alone is insufficient
for protecting the final aggregated sum from unauthorized routers, since eventually a single
routing node will compute the final aggregation that will be distributed to psub. Therefore,
we also require that each publisher pi generates a random number qi and publishesm shares
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of the value vi − qi. In our protocol, the subscriber psub will know the method that each pi
uses to choose qi and thus can reconstruct the actual sum from the aggregate value that they
eventually receive from the pub-sub system.
Our confidentiality-preserving aggregation protocol consists of the following steps:
Initial secret sharing. Each publisher pi generates a secret qi that is used in conjunction
with the hash function H : Zp × T → Zp where T is a set of all timestamps, to
generate the sequence of qi values needed during the publication process. The value
p is a large prime number.
1. Each publisher generates a seed qi randomly and sends qi to the subscriber psub
secretly.
Note that this secret sharing process need only be performed once at the beginning of
a subscription request.
Publication of data. Publisher pi publishes the value vi at time tl as follows:
1. Compute v′i = vi−H(qi, tl). This step is necessary to protect the sum
∑n
i=1 vi
from the untrusted routing node that computes the sum of all shares.
2. Update qi as H(qi, tl).
3. Randomly split v′i intom shares v
′
i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m such that v
′
i =
∑m
j=1 v
′
i,j .
4. Send shares v′i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m tom different routing nodes.
Aggregation on routing nodes. Each routing node receives some number of shares from
publishers or other routing nodes and sends the sum of these shares to the next routing
node along the aggregation path. (We assume that the security manager determines a
routing path for each subscription request.) Each routing node performs the following
steps:
1. Receive shares v1, . . . , vk from k publishers and/or routing nodes. Note that
each of these shares is associated with the same timestamp tl.
2. Compute the sum of the shares v =
∑k
i=1 vi.
3. Send (v, tl) to the next routing node along the aggregation path specified by the
security manager.
Computation of the sum. We assume that the security manager establishes an aggrega-
tion path such that there is a single routing node that computes the sum v′sum of all
the shares published by all of the publishers. After the subscriber psub receives the
aggregate value v′sum associated with timestamp tl, it performs the following steps to
compute the sum.
1. Compute sum vsum = v′sum +
∑n
i=1H(qi, tl) =
∑n
i=1 vi.
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2. Update qi as H(qi, tl) for i = 1 to n.
Note that a naive aggregation protocol has a communication overhead ofO(n+r)where
n is the number of publishers and r is the number of routing nodes. Our confidentiality-
preserving aggregation protocol, however, has a communication overhead of the order
O(nm + r) because each publisher must send m shares to the pub-sub system. We now
make the following claims regarding the security properties of this protocol.
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality of aggregate sum). No coalition of colluding routing nodes can
obtain the sum
∑n
i=1 vi.
Proof. Note that a routing node can only obtain the sum v′sum =
∑n
i=1 v
′
i where v
′
i =
vi − H(qi, tl). Since v′sum has no correlation with the actual sum vsum =
∑n
i=1 vi, it is
impossible for a routing node to learn any information about vsum without knowing the
random qi values shared between each pi and the subscriber psub.
Theorem 2 (Confidentiality of an individual data vi). Letm be the number of shares gener-
ated by each publisher. No colluding adversary of up to sizem that includes routing nodes
and the subscriber psub can obtain any principal pi’s private data vi.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we discuss the confidentiality of the variable vi main-
tained by publisher pi. The same argument holds for the other publishers’ variables. Pub-
lisher pi splits v′i = vi −H(qi, tl) into m pieces and send each share to a different routing
node. Since all of the messages sent between pi and the routing nodes are encrypted using
pairwise shared keys, the only way to restore v′i is to obtain all the shares of v
′
i from them
routing nodes receiving these shares. Restoring vi from v′i also requires the value qi shared
between pi and psub. Thus, at leastm+ 1 colluding parties are required to obtain the value
of vi.
3.2 Integrity-preserving aggregation
We next describe an aggregation protocol that ensures only the integrity of the computed
aggregate sum. We describe the protocol using the same example aggregation scenario used
in Section 3.1. Our integrity-preserving aggregation protocol allows the subscriber psub to
verify the integrity of the sum by leveraging a homomorphic MAC scheme based on the
discrete logarithm property. A publisher generates the MAC of a value v by computing
MAC (v, g) = gv, where g is a generator for some multiplicative group Gp of prime order
p. We assume that every principal knows the large prime number p that parameterizes Gp,
and that the generator g is a shared secret among the publishers and the subscriber psub. As
we will see, the second assumption ensures that a malicious routing node cannot modify an
aggregated sum without being detected by the subscriber psub. This MAC scheme has the
homomorphic property MAC (v1, g) ×MAC (v2, g) = MAC (v1 + v2, g) since gv1gv2 =
gv1+v2 . Our integrity-preserving aggregation protocol consists of the following steps:
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Initial secret sharing. All of the publishers and the subscriber psub share a secret genera-
tor g, which is chosen by the security manager. Therefore, the subscriber psub needs
to trust the security manager not to disclose g to the routing nodes. We assume that
publishers will not disclose g to the routing nodes since a malicious publisher can
always modify the aggregated sum by providing malicious input data. Each pub-
lisher pi and the subscriber psub also share a secret seed qi as was the case in the
confidentiality-preserving protocol in Section 3.1.
1. The security manager generates a generator g for the group Gp randomly and
sends g to each publisher pi and subscriber psub secretly. It is assumed that all
principals (including routers) know the prime order p of Gp.
2. Each publisher generates a seed qi randomly and sends qi to the subscriber psub
secretly.
Publication of data. This protocol does not preserve the confidentiality of each publisher
pi’s variable vi. However, we still require each publisher pi to subtract a random
number H(qi, l) from vi because we cannot allow malicious routing nodes to learn
a valid (value, MAC ) pair (v, c) where c = MAC (v, g). Otherwise, a malicious
routing node could construct a bogus (value, MAC ) pair (kv, ck) for any k ∈ N
by exploiting the homomorphic property of the MAC scheme. Each publisher thus
performs the following steps:
1. Compute v′i = vi −H(qi, tl).
2. Update qi as H(qi, tl).
3. Compute the MAC c(vi) = MAC (vi, g) = gvi .
4. Send the value v′i and MAC c(vi) to one of the routing nodes.
Notice that the routing node receiving v′i can learn vi by colluding with the subscriber
psub, since psub knows qi in this protocol. Hence, this protocol preserves only the
integrity of the aggregation computation.
Aggregation on routing nodes. During the protocol, each routing node receives some num-
ber of (value, MAC ) pairs from publishers and/or other routing nodes. The router
then computes the sum of those values and the product of those MACs, and passes
the results to the routing node along the aggregation path. Each routing node per-
forms the following steps:
1. Receive the (value, MAC ) pairs (v1, c1), . . . , (vk, ck) from other publishers
and/or routing nodes in the system. Note that each pair is associated with the
same timestamp tl.
2. Compute the sum of the shares v =
∑k
i=1 vi.
3. Compute the product of the MACs c =
∏k
i=1 ci.
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4. Send (v, c) and the timestamp tl to the next routing node along the aggregation
path.
Computation and verification of the sum After subscriber psub receives v′sum and theMAC
csum from the last routing node in the pub-sub system, psub computes the sum vsum
and verifies its correctness using the MAC csum as follows:
1. Receive v′sum and csum.
2. Compute the sum vsum = v′sum +
∑n
i=1H(qi, tl) =
∑n
i=1 vi.
3. Update qi as H(qi, tl) for i = 1 to n.
4. Accept sum vsum if gvsum = csum holds.
Our integrity-preserving protocol requires the same number of messages as a simple
aggregation protocol that does not ensure the integrity of the aggregated data. However,
each message of our protocol must also include a MAC of 1024 bits. We now formally
prove that our protocol ensures the integrity of aggregated data.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). The probability that the subscriber psub accepts an incorrect
vsum 6=
∑n
i=1 vi is no more than the probability that an adversary can randomly generate
a valid (value,MAC ) pair (v, c) such thatMAC (v, g) = c.
Proof. We consider an adversary who controls all of the routing nodes in the pub-sub sys-
tem. There are two ways for such an adversary to generate a valid (value,MAC ) pair. The
first way is to learn the secret generator g. In this case, the routing node that sends the
pair (v′sum, csum) to psum can instead transmit (v′sum + k, gk × csum) for any k ∈ N. The
subscriber psub will accept these modified values as correct because if the original pair is
valid (i.e., csum = gv
′
sum+r where r =
∑n
i=1H(qi, tl)), then g
v′sum+k+r = gk×gv′sum+r =
gk× csum also holds. The second way is to learn the sum vsum that corresponds to a partic-
ular MAC csum. In this case, the adversary can generate other valid pairs (kv, ck) for any
k ∈ N.
We claim that the adversary obtains no information about the generator g or the ag-
gregated sum vsum from the information gained during the execution of the integrity-
preserving aggregation protocol. The colluding nodes receive from each publisher pi the
value v′i = vi −H(qi, tl) and the MAC c(vi). First, we show that the colluding nodes learn
nothing about the generator g. Specifically, for any gˆ ∈ Gp, there exists a value vˆ and a
seed qˆ such that MAC (vˆ, gˆ) = MAC (vi, g) and vi − H(qi, tl) = vˆ − H(qˆ, tl). Since
MAC (vi, g) ∈ Gp and gˆ is a generator for Gp, there must exist a vˆ such that gˆvˆ = gvi .
Given this vˆ, it is then possible to choose a qˆ such that v′i = vˆ −H(qˆ, tl). This implies that
the disclosure of v′i and c(vi) reveals no information about g.
Next, we show that the routing nodes learn nothing about vsum from v′sum and csum.
Given any fake sum vˆ, there always exists a seed qˆ and generator gˆ such that v′sum = vˆ −
H(qˆ, tl) and MAC (vsum, g) = MAC (vˆ, gˆ). To prove the existence of such a qˆ and gˆ, we
first note that there exists a qˆ such that v′sum = vˆ −H(qˆ, tl). At this point, gˆ can be chosen
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such that gˆ = c1/vˆsum. As a result, MAC (vˆ, gˆ) = gˆvˆ = MAC (vi, g)vˆ/vˆ = MAC (vi, g).
Since the colluding nodes gain no information on generator g or the sum vsum from the
aggregation process, the probability of generating a valid (value, MAC ) pair is no better
than that of randomly guessing.
3.3 Secure aggregation
We now present a secure aggregation protocol that ensures the integrity of aggregated data
while also preserving the confidentiality of both individual input values and the aggregated
sum. We develop this new protocol by combining the two previous protocols presented in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2. In this protocol, each publisher pi publishes shares of the MAC of
variable vi as well as shares of the value obtained by subtracting some random number from
vi. The protocol consists of the following steps:
Initial secret sharing. This step is exactly same as the initial secret sharing step in the
integrity-preserving aggregation protocol presented in Section 3.2.
Publication of data. In this step, each publisher pi publishes m shares that sum to the
value vi −H(qi, tl) andm other shares whose product isMAC (vi, g). In particular,
each publisher performs the following steps:
1. Compute v′i = vi −H(qi, tl).
2. Update qi as H(qi, tl).
3. Split v′i intom shares v
′
i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m randomly such that v
′
i =
∑m
j=1 v
′
i,j .
4. Split vi intom shares vi,1, . . . , vi,m randomly such that vi =
∑m
j=1 vi,j .
5. Compute the MAC c(vi,j) = MAC (vi,j , g) = gvi,j for j = 1 tom.
6. Send the (value, MAC ) pairs (v′i,1, c(vi,1)), . . . , (v
′
i,m, c(vi,m)) to m different
routing nodes.
We split the MAC of vi into multiple shares to prevent a malicious routing node from
colluding with a malicious subscriber to attempt to compute the value vi from the
MAC gvi . This would be possible if, for example, the expected domain of vi was
small (e.g., if all vi are expected to be close to some average value).
Aggregation on routing nodes. Each routing node receives shares of values and MACs
from publishers and/or other routing nodes. The router then computes the sum of the
value shares and the product of the MAC shares. Each routing node performs the
following:
1. Receive the (value, MAC ) pairs (v1, c1), . . . , (vk, ck), from some set of pub-
lishers and/or other routing nodes. Note that each (value,MAC ) pair is associ-
ated with the same timestamp tl,
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2. Compute the sum of the shares v =
∑k
i=1 vi.
3. Compute the product of the MACs c =
∏k
i=1 ci.
4. Send (v, c) and the timestamp tl to the next routing node along the aggregation
path specified by the security manager.
Computation and verification of the sum After the subscriber psub receives the sum v′sum
and the MAC csum from the last routing node in the aggregation path, they perform
the following steps to compute the sum of v1, . . . , vn and verify its correctness:
1. Compute the sum vsum = v′sum +
∑n
i=1H(qi, tl) =
∑n
i=1 vi.
2. Update qi as H(qi, tl) for i = 1 to n.
3. Accept the sum vsum if gvsum = csum holds.
This secure aggregation protocol has the same communication complexity as the proto-
col presented in Section 3.1, but each message also includes a MAC value of 1024 bits.
We now consider the security properties of this secure aggregation protocol. The secure
aggregation protocol preserves the confidentiality of the aggregate sum and individual data
items as in Theorems 1 and 2. The proofs for this protocol are the same as those for
the confidentiality-preserving protocol in Section 3.1, and thus we omit them here. We
now prove that the secure aggregation protocol satisfies the soundness property stated in
Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 (Soundness). The secure aggregation protocol satisfies the soundness property
stated in Theorem 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Secure aggregation with an authenticated MAC
In the secure aggregation protocol described in Section 3.3, the generator g used in the
MAC scheme must be kept secret from the untrusted routing nodes. Otherwise, a malicious
router could modify a (v′sum, csum) pair as was described in the proof of Theorem 3, thereby
forcing a subscriber to accept an incorrect aggregate value. Therefore, in that section, we
made the assumption that each subscriber trusts the other subscribers not to collude with
the untrusted routing nodes. In this section, we show how this assumption can be removed
by taking a delayed verification approach to ensuring the integrity of received aggregate
values.
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism used by our approach to providing subscribers with
an authenticated MAC. For brevity, we only show a single routing node that sends the final
result to the subscribers in Figure 2. In our scheme, the publishers and the security manager
share a secret value s that is used to generate a psuedorandom sequence of generators for
Gp that will be used by the MAC scheme. At each time tl, a new generator is created
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Figure 2: Example of authenticating an aggregated MAC. The arrows shows the sequence
of messages. For brevity, we only show the root routing node of a routing path in a pub-sub
system.
by the publishers and used to commit to values published during the current round of the
aggregation. Value and MAC shares are then published and aggregated by the pub-sub
system as described in Section 3.3, and eventually received by the subscribers in the system.
After a subscriber receives a (v′sum, csum) pair at time tl, he notifies the security manager
that the value has been received. After the security manager receives such a notification
from every publisher, it uses the generator gl−1 from the previous round and the secret s to
create the generator gl. The generator gl is then released to all of the publishers, who can
then verify the integrity of the sum that was computed.
Notice that the subscribers cannot create the generator gl themselves using gl−1, as do-
ing so requires knowledge of the secret s, which is shared only between the publishers and
the security manager. As a result, no subscriber can verify the integrity of the aggregation
that they receive during a particular round of the negotiation until all subscribers have re-
ceived the aggregated value computed during that round. By forcing the system to proceed
in a lockstep manner, the threat of malicious subscribers colluding with the routing nodes
in the system to force other subscribers to accept incorrect aggregate values is clearly elim-
inated. This benefit comes at the cost of delaying the verification of the sums computed
during the protocol; whether this delay is acceptable is application dependent, and may
vary depending upon the environment in which our algorithm is deployed.
5 Related work
In this section, we discuss related research efforts. We first examine existing security
solutions for pub-sub systems and next discuss secure aggregation protocols for sensor
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networks. We finally cover research on verification of aggregated queries on outsourced
databases briefly.
5.1 Security in a pub-sub system
Many researchers have explored the security issues that arise in pub-sub systems. Wang
et al. [24] describe various security issues with varying trust assumptions in a pub-sub
system. In this paper, we focus on the issue of publication confidentiality and integrity
under the presence of untrusted routing nodes, to which Wang et al. do not provide any
concrete solutions.
Several researchers [25] have studied policy languages and enforcement mechanisms
for limiting access to events in pub-sub systems with trusted routing nodes. Miklos [12]
provides a policy language that defines access-control policies as filters in a pub-sub sys-
tem. Zhao and Sturman [25] implement an access-control mechanism as a message filter
on trusted routing nodes. Pesonen et al. [14] provides a scheme for delegation-based ac-
cess control in a pub-sub system involving multiple security domains. Opyrchal et al. [13]
develop an efficient key distribution scheme based on techniques of key caching to ensure
confidentiality from end-point routing nodes to groups of subscribers. In this paper, we
consider policy enforcement in systems with untrusted routing nodes.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate security issues in pub-sub systems with
untrusted routing nodes. However, none of this research addresses security issues associated
with aggregated data. Khurana’s scheme [11] ensures publication confidentiality against
routing nodes by encrypting confidential fields of each event with a key shared between
a publisher and subscribers. Pesonen et al. [15] also use encryption on event attributes to
protect confidential data from untrusted routing nodes. Raiciu et al. [16] developed several
security protocols that allow routers to perform content-based filtering based on equality,
keywords, and numeric values while keeping publications and subscriptions confidential
from those routers. EventGuard [20] provides a comprehensive solution to various secu-
rity problems in pub-sub systems that involve untrusted routing nodes. EventGuard ensures
publication confidentiality by encrypting events with a shared key shared by publishers and
subscribers. EventGuard has a central authority to issue a group key per each topic. Event-
Guard also ensures publication integrity by requiring publishers to sign their events. How-
ever, EventGuard does not address publication confidentiality and integrity for aggregated
data.
Ahmad et al. [1] developed a secure additive aggregation protocol in a large-scale over-
lay network. Their protocol uses an additively homomorphic public-key cryptosystem to
protect confidential data from intermediate aggregation nodes. However, their scheme does
not address the issue of integrity discussed in this paper. That is, there is no way for a
subscriber to verify that no malicious intermediate node added an encrypted share multiple
times to change the value of the sum.
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5.2 Secure aggregation in a sensor network
Secure aggregation that ensures the confidentiality of raw data and the integrity of aggre-
gated data has been mainly studied in the context of wireless sensor networks. In a sensor
network, there is a single sink node that obtains aggregated data derived from sensor read-
ings. Since the sink node is trusted to read all sensor readings, we do not consider the attack
by colluding sensor nodes and the sink node, as we did for colluding parties of routing nodes
and a subscriber.
Wagner [23] studies which aggregation functions can be securely computed in the pres-
ence of a few compromised nodes providing malicious input data. His model assumes that
aggregation is performed in a single sink node of a sensor network. In this paper, we con-
sider the case in which each subscriber trusts the publishers of aggregated data to provide
correct inputs, and thus our security model excludes his threat model.
A number of aggregation protocols have been developed to ensure the confidentiality
of sensor data from intermediate aggregator nodes. PDA [8] supports additive aggrega-
tion using a technique of secret splitting that is similar to ours, while protecting each sensor
reading from other sensor nodes. However, PDA does not ensure the integrity of aggregated
data. CDA [6] supports additive aggregation using an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme to protect confidential sensor data from intermediate nodes that perform aggrega-
tion. In CDA, sensor nodes performing aggregation cannot report sensing data. Castelluccia
et al. [4] also allows aggregation of encrypted data using an additively homomorphic stream
cipher where each sensor node can have a different shared key with a sink node. Therefore,
sensor nodes publishing data and aggregation nodes do not have to be disjoint. Solutions
based on homomorphic encryption are not applicable to our problem since a malicious rout-
ing node that colludes with an unauthorized subscriber can forward an encrypted individual
data to the subscriber who can decrypt it.
There are a few aggregation protocols that ensure the integrity of aggregated data. Hu
and Evans [9] develop a secure aggregation protocol that ensures the integrity of aggregated
data. In their protocol, each sensor node publishes data along with a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) constructed using a key generated every time it sends new data. Each
node’s parent forwards that data and its MAC along with the MAC for the aggregated data
it receives to its parent. At every round of the protocol, a base station needs to broadcast
the keys used by sensor nodes at the previous round so that each sensor node can verify the
MACs that it received from other nodes. If a pair of child-parent nodes in the sensor net-
work is compromised, their protocol cannot ensure the integrity of aggregated data. On the
other hand, our scheme ensures integrity under the presence of an arbitrary number of un-
trusted routing nodes. Chan et al. [5]’s aggregation protocol ensures the integrity of additive
aggregation by enabling sensor nodes to construct a commitment tree in a distributed fash-
ion while they perform in-network aggregation. The base station receiving the sum verifies
its correctness by sending the root vertex of the commitment tree to all sensor nodes using
an authenticated broadcast. If each sensor node can verify that its contribution was added
to the sum by checking the commitment tree, the base station accepts the sum. Although
Chan’s protocol does not involve expensive cryptographic operations, it is not applicable
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to a pub-sub system where routing nodes are deployed across a wide-area network because
the authenticated broadcast would be inefficient in this case.
5.3 Verification of aggregated queries
Haber et al. [7] address the problem of verifying the integrity of aggregate queries on out-
sourced databases. They develop a verification protocol that allows a user to verify the
integrity of the sum of multiple values in a database without seeing those individual values.
This query is processed by an untrusted service provider that is different from the trusted
database owner. Since a single database owner provides all of the individual values for the
sum, their protocol can ensure the integrity of the sum by providing the user with a Merkle
hash tree of commitments to the individual values, so that the user can verify the authentic-
ity of those commitments with a digital signature on the root node of the hash tree created
by the database owner. This solution of constructing a single digital signature on multiple
commitments is not applicable to our problem, since each individual data is provided by a
different publisher.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a secure aggregation protocol for computing the additive func-
tion sum in a publish-subscribe system. Our protocol allows an aggregated value to be
computed from the raw inputs of some number of publishers in a privacy-preserving man-
ner. Secret splitting is used to ensure that as long as no more than m parties collude, no
principal’s private data value will be leaked. Our protocol further guarantees that the com-
puted aggregate is disclosed only to authorized subscribers and cannot be inferred by the
untrusted routing infrastructure that comprises the pub-sub system. In addition, our scheme
allows subscribers to verify the correctness of the aggregate value computed by the system
by leveraging a homomorphic message authentication (MAC) scheme based on the dis-
crete logarithm property. This MAC scheme allows the correctness of an aggregation to
be verified by subscribers and imposes a small constant-size data transmission overhead,
regardless of the number of publishers contributing to the aggregate value computed by the
system.
In the future, we hope to develop support for other useful aggregate functions, such as
min and max. We also plan to incorporate a fault tolerance mechanism that allows partial
aggregates to be computed in the presence of failed publisher nodes. Supporting such a
mechanism will require an access control policy language that specifies both disclosure
constraints, as well as constraints on the number of failed nodes that will be tolerated by a
given publisher.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. To prove this claim, we consider an adversary who controls all of the routing nodes
in the pub-sub system. Using an argument similar to that used in Theorem 3, we can show
that such an adversary obtains no information about the generator g or the aggregated sum
vsum during the execution of the protocol.
The colluding nodes receive from each publisher pi the shares (v′i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m) of the
value vi and the shares (MAC (vi,1, g), . . . ,MAC (vi,m, g)) of the MAC MAC (vi, g) to
value vi. The routing nodes learn nothing about the generator g from these shares, since
for every generator gˆ, there exists some secret seed qˆi and some value vˆi such that v′i =
vˆi −H(qˆ, tl) and MAC (vi,k, g) = MAC (vˆi,k, gˆ) for k = 1 to m. To prove the existence
of such a vˆi and qˆi, we first note that by the definition of a generator, there exists some
vˆi,1, . . . , vˆi,m such that MAC (vi,k, g) = MAC (vˆi,k, gˆ) for k = 1 to m. Given these m
values, vˆi can be chosen as
∑m
k=1 vˆi,k. At this point, it is possible to choose qˆi such that
v′i = vˆi −H(qˆi, tl).
Similarly, the routing nodes learn nothing about the value vi, since given any value vˆi,
the existence of another seed qˆi and generator gˆ that can be used to generate the same sets of
shares is always guaranteed. To prove the existence of such a qˆi and gˆ, we first note that the
existence of a qˆ such that v′i = vˆi −H(qˆ, tl) is guaranteed. By an argument similar to that
used in the proof of Theorem 3, there exists a gˆ such that gˆvˆi =
∏m
k=1MAC (vi,k, g) = g
vi .
Given this gˆ, there exist values vˆi,1, . . . , vˆi,m−1 such that MAC (vi,k, g) = MAC (vˆi,k, gˆ)
for k = 1 to m − 1 by the definition of a generator. The value vˆi,m can then be chosen as
vˆi −
∑m−1
k=1 vˆi,k. We can show thatMAC (vˆi,m, gˆ) = MAC (vi,m, g) as follows:
MAC (vˆi,m, gˆ) = gˆvˆi,m
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= gˆvˆi−
Pm−1
k=1 vˆi,k
= gˆvˆi/gˆ
Pm−1
k=1 vˆi,k
=
m∏
k=1
MAC (vi,k, g)/
m−1∏
k=1
MAC (vi,k, g)
= MAC (vi,m, g)
Since the colluding nodes gain no information on generator g, the individual values vi,
or the sum vsum from the aggregation process, the probability of generating a valid (value,
MAC ) pair is no better than that of randomly guessing such a pair.
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